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Abstract 
The experience of authorship over one’s actions and their consequences - sense of agency - is a 
fundamental aspect of conscious experience. In recent years, it has become common to use 
intentional binding as an implicit measure of the sense of agency. However, it remains contentious 
whether binding effects indicate the role of intention-related information in perception or merely 
represent a strong case of multisensory causal binding. Here, we use a novel virtual reality setup to 
demonstrate identical magnitude binding effects both in the presence and complete absence of 
intentional action, when perceptual stimuli are matched for temporal and spatial information. Our 
results demonstrate that intentional binding-like effects are most simply accounted for by 
multisensory causal binding, without necessarily being related to intention or agency. Future studies 
which relate binding effects to agency must provide evidence for effects beyond that expected for 
multisensory causal binding by itself. 
  
Keywords:  Intentional Binding, Sense of Agency, Multisensory Integration, Virtual Reality, 
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Introduction 
The sense of agency is the feeling of authorship over one’s intentional actions and their external 
consequences (Haggard, 2017). Intentional binding refers to the perceived compression of the time 
interval between an intentional action (commonly a button press) and its outcome (commonly a 
brief auditory tone). This effect is often employed in empirical investigations of the sense of agency 
as an implicit measure, because while it appears to be sensitive to agency, it requires no explicit 
reflection upon agency (Moore & Obhi, 2012). Binding can be measured by various methods, 
including timing individual action and outcome events (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002), delay 
judgements (Kawabe, Roseboom, & Nishida, 2013) or direct estimation of intervals (Engbert, 
Wohlschläger, Thomas, & Haggard, 2007).  
 
Differences in the magnitude of binding are often considered to reflect differences in the sense of 
agency (e.g. Caspar, Christensen, Cleeremans, & Haggard, 2016; Khalighinejad, Di Costa, & Haggard, 
2016; Lush, Parkinson, & Dienes, 2016) but this relationship is not straightforward. It has been 
demonstrated that causal relationships influence binding to the degree that the effect can occur in 
the absence of intentional action, providing a causal relationship between the two events is believed 
to exist (Buehner, 2012, 2015; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 
2009). Failing to control for the influence of causality on binding is likely to lead to inaccurate 
interpretations of results. For example, (Haggard et al., 2002) report differences in binding following 
either an intentional button press or movement triggered involuntarily. However, because the tone 
was not caused by the movement in the involuntary condition, differences in the magnitude of 
binding are likely to reflect beliefs about causality rather than intentions (Buehner, 2015; Desantis, 
Hughes, & Waszak, 2012). While binding can occur in the absence of intentions, intentional binding 
is generally stronger than that arising from the observation of external events believed to be causally 
related (Buehner, 2012, 2015), or from passive actions (Lush et al., 2017). It is currently an open 
question whether causal binding can be equal in magnitude to intentional binding as, to our 
knowledge, no statistical evidence has been published to test such a claim. 
 
Here, we investigate whether equal magnitude temporal binding effects can be found with and 
without intentional action using an interval estimation task in a realistic virtual reality setup. Using 
virtual reality allows us to provide identical visual and tactile feedback for intentional and merely 
observed actions, matching the spatio-temporal properties of external sensory information between 
intentional and non-intentional presentations. 
Methods 
Participants 
Fifty-one participants completed Experiment 1 (mean age = 24.14, SD = 5.21; 30 females, 5 left-
handed). 20 participants completed Experiment 2 (mean age = 26.65, SD = 5.96; 12 females, 2 left-
handed)). 30 participants completed Experiment 3 (mean age = 21.17, SD = 3.07; 23 females, 1 left-
handed. Three participants were excluded from Experiment 1 as their responses did not increase 
proportionally to the presented temporal interval. Participants provided informed consent before 
taking part and received £5 or course credits as compensation for their time. The experiment was 
approved by the University of Sussex ethics committee. 
Apparatus and Setup 
In Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, we used a head mounted display (HMD) (Oculus Rift CV1, Oculus 
VR, Irvine, CA, USA) with an optical motion tracker (Leap Motion, LEAP MOTION, INC., San Francisco, 
CA, USA) attached to the front of the HMD. Sounds was presented through the headphones built 
into the HMD. To provide tactile stimulation, a vibrating motor (DC-3V, 10 x 3mm) was attached to 
the participant’s index finger. Participants were seated in front of a desk, situated so that they could 
comfortably rest their hands upon it. The desktop was transparent acrylic to enhance tracking 
performance of the optical motion tracker.  
 
In Experiment 3, in addition to the above setup, we added a stereo camera (OVRVision, 
Shinobiya.com Co.,Ltd, Osaka, Japan) positioned immediately above the motion tracking sensor on 
the HMD. The desk and part of the background was covered with a green sheet. The image from the 
stereo camera was processed in chroma-key so that only the hand image was projected in the virtual 
environment. Participants could still interact with the virtual button through use of the tracking 
information from the optical motion tracker. The experiment setup was developed in Unity (Unity 
Technologies, San Francisco, CA, USA).  
 
Within the HMD, participants were able to look around the 3D virtual space with the virtual desk 
located at approximately the same location as the physical desk. On the virtual desk, there was a red 
button (a round shape 2cm in radius and 2cm in height; with a button stroke of 1cm), which could be 
interacted with by the virtual hand. When pressed, the red button flashed white for 50msec and 
triggered the vibrating motor to vibrate for 50 msec, providing tactile feedback. White dots were 
drawn alongside the red button (9cm away from the button) on the desk, indicating the initial 
position of the hand during the experiment (See also Procedure). A spherical screen in the 
background projected a panoramic image of the experiment room, so that participants would feel as 
if they were physically located in the room. In Experiments 1 and 2 where virtual hands were 
presented, participants’ hands were tracked by the optical sensor and the hand movements 
replicated in the virtual hands in real time. We prepared male and female looking hands, each with 3 
different possible skin tones (lighter, middle, and darker tones). The experimenter chose the hand 
model matching as closely as possible the participants’ real hand. 
 
 Figure 1. Experimental apparatus and participants’ view during the experiments. Left: External view 
of experiment setup. Right: Internal view with virtual hand, button, and response panel.  
Procedure 
Experiment 1 
Participants wore the HMD and the vibrating motor was attached to the index finger of their 
dominant hand. The entire experiment, including task instructions and response screens, was 
completed within the virtual reality environment.  The experiment consisted of three sessions: 
training, practice, and main session. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants completed a training session in which they were 
familiarised to the interval estimation task. Participants heard two tones (880Hz, 50ms) in succession 
through the headphones in the HMD. The interval between the tones was pseudo-randomly chosen 
from three levels (200, 400, and 800msec). These three base intervals were identical to the ones 
used in the main experiments. To avoid participants using the training feedback (see below) to learn 
the specific three levels of interval that would be used in the main experiments, the interval in each 
trial was adjusted by a random jitter between -100 to +100msec. 500ms after the second tone 
denoted the end of the interval, a floating panel appeared in the HMD to prompt participants to 
report the estimated intervals using 3-digit numbers (Figure 2). They used their dominant hand to 
press numeric keys to enter the numbers. Immediately following entry of the third digit, the 
physically presented interval was shown on the panel to provide training feedback. Participants 
completed 18 trials in the training session. 
 
After the training session, the participants moved to a practice session which was identical to Active 
block in the main session. Participants were instructed to press the red button on the virtual desk 
using the index finger of their dominant hand. They were also instructed to return their hand back 
the trial starting point (a white dot on the desk; left or right according to their dominant hand) 
following each response (Figure 1).  A tone followed the button press after an interval (200, 400, or 
800msec, pseudo-randomly selected). In this session, participants’ hand movements were recorded. 
Participants were instructed that it was crucial that they wait for a couple of seconds from the start 
of each trial before initiating their action in order to ensure temporal separation between trials. 
500ms after the button was pressed, the floating number panel appeared, and they were prompted 
to enter their estimate of interval duration (no feedback regarding the actual duration was given 
during experimental trials). Data in the practice session were not included in the analysis. 
Participants completed 10 trials in the practice session.  
 
The main experiment consisted of 2 sets of trials for each of 3 different conditions: Active (A), No 
Hand (N), and Fake (F). The order of the 3 conditions was randomised and counterbalanced across 
participants (e.g. AFNNFA for Participant 1, NFAAFN for Participant 2). In Active blocks, participants 
performed the same task as during the practice session. In No Hand and Fake blocks, participants 
were instructed not to move their hand. Instead, participants either observed the red button be 
depressed on its own (No Hand condition) or watched the virtual hand move and press the button 
(Fake condition). The hand movements in Fake trials were randomly selected from recordings of the 
participants’ own hand movements during the practice sessions. The No Hand and Fake conditions 
can be understood as different versions of a ‘passive’ condition in which the button press happens 
without intentional action. After a button press (either physically caused by participants in Active 
trials or automatically triggered in No Hand or Fake trials), participants reported button press-tone 
intervals as in the practice trials. After every 20 trials, there was a 10 second break. Participants 
completed 51 trials for each block of trials (17 trials per interval). The experiment took about 1 hour 
in total to complete, including instruction and debriefing. 
Experiment 2 
The procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 but there was no interval judgement 
task and no No Hand condition (i.e., only Active and Fake conditions). In a given block of trials, 
participants were prompted to answer one of two distinct questions about agency and causality 
following each trial. The first question related to agency or control over the tone: “How much did you 
feel your action caused the tone to occur?”. The second question related to apparent causality more 
generally: “To what degree did the moving hand cause the tone to occur?”. These questions were 
answered by selecting 1-5 on a Likert scale, using a slider on a floating panel (Figure 2). Participants 
were carefully instructed in the precise meaning of these question (i.e. the former means YOU 
caused the tone to occur, and the latter means the HAND caused the tone to occur, regardless of the 
hand’s apparent connection to you). 
As we did not use the interval judgement task, the training session regarding reporting the intervals 
was skipped. After completing the practice session regarding pressing the virtual button (as 
described above), participants started the two Active and two Fake blocks of trials, the order of 
which was counterbalanced across participants (i.e. ‘AFFA’ for odd numbered participants, ‘FAAF’ for 
even numbered participants). The floating panel on which the questions were presented appeared 
after participants pressed the button (Active trials) or after the virtual hand had pressed the button 
(Fake trials). One of the two questions (agency or causality) was presented in each block. The order 
of the questions was also counterbalanced across participants. 
 Figure 2. Participants’ view during different phases of the experiments. Top-Left: Hand reaching to 
press the button. Top-Right: Response panel for interval estimation task in Experiment 1. Bottom-
Left: agency response panel in Experiment 2. Bottom-Right: Causality response panel in Experiment 
2. 
Experiment 3 
The procedure in Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 1 except that only Active and No Hand 
blocks were presented. Because of the absence of Fake blocks, no practice block in which hand 
movements were recorded (as in Experiment 1) were necessary. The order of the Active and No 
Hand blocks was counterbalanced across participants. 
Statistical analyses  
We assessed strength of evidence for effects with 1 degree of freedom using Bayes factors (BFs). 
This allowed us to infer not only if there is sensitive evidence in favour of the experimental 
hypothesis, but also to interpret evidence in favour of null hypothesis or conclude that the data are 
insensitive for a given contrast. A Bayes factor greater than 3 indicates sensitive evidence for the 
experimental hypothesis and a Bayes factor smaller than 1/3 indicates sensitive evidence for the null 
hypothesis. Bayes factors in between these two thresholds (above 1/3 but below 3 indicate that the 
data were insensitive and therefore provide no evidence either way (see Dienes, 2014; Jeffreys, 
1939). BH(0,x) refers to a Bayes factor in which the experimental hypothesis was modeled as a half-
normal distribution with a standard deviation of x (see Dienes, 2014); directional predictions can be 
modeled by a half-normal distribution with SD based on existing results. BN(0,x) refers to a Bayes 
factor in which the experimental hypothesis was specified as a normal distribution with mean of 0 
and a standard deviation of x. This was used for nondirectional predictions where a plausible effect 
size could be predicted. BU[min,max] refers to a Bayes factor in which the experimental hypothesis was 
modeled as a uniform distribution from minimum to maximum. This was used where there was no 
specific prediction about effect size, but there was a known maximum possible effect. As an 
indication of the robustness of Bayesian conclusions, a robustness region is reported for each B. The 
robustness region provides the range of scales over which a conclusion would be qualitatively 
consistent with conclusion obtained (i.e. evidence supports the null hypothesis, the alternative 
hypothesis, or is insensitive) and is notated as RR [x1, x2] where x1 is the smallest SD supporting that 
conclusion and x2 the largest. For all frequentist statistics, Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons was applied where appropriate. 
Results 
Experiment 1 
Predictions 
To examine whether equal magnitude temporal binding effects can be found with and without 
intentional action, we contrasted interval estimation between the condition with (Active) and the 
conditions without (Fake, No Hand) intentional action. A previous study by Caspar and colleagues 
(Caspar, Cleeremans, & Haggard, 2015) report the results of an experiment relevant to predictions 
here. In an intentional binding study using interval estimation, a robot hand which activated an 
outcome (by pressing a button) was triggered either by the participant’s intentional action or by the 
experimenter pressing upon their finger (passive action). Averaged interval estimation (the average 
of three levels: 200, 400 and 800 msec) was 122.5 msec longer when the robotic hand was activated 
by intentional action than by passive action. Based on this result, we predicted that the average 
interval estimate would be shorter in our condition that included intentional action (Active) versus 
each of the other conditions that did not (No Hand and Fake). We therefore calculated Bayes factors 
for directional predictions of differences between these conditions using a half-normal with an SD of 
122.5 msec. For the comparison of the Fake versus No Hand conditions we made no directional 
prediction and therefore calculated a Bayes factor using a full normal with a mean of 0 and an SD of 
122.5 msec. 
Results 
Figure 3 shows the average of 48 participants’ reported intervals for each presented interval (200, 
400, 800 msec), in each condition (Active, No Hand, Fake). Following previous work (Caspar et al., 
2015), we first conducted a 3x3 repeated measures ANOVA on the reported intervals with within-
subject factors of the three experimental conditions (Active, No Hand, and Fake) and three 
presented intervals (200, 400, 800 msec). This analysis revealed a main effect of condition, (F(2, 94) 
= 7.213, p=0.001, η² = 0.133) and also, as expected if participants’ interval estimates increased with 
the physically presented interval, of interval (F(1.176,55.294) = 403.891, p<0.001, η²  = 0.896, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected).  
 
To examine the simple effects in the above analysis, we calculated the average of interval estimates 
across the three presented intervals, for each participant and condition, and conducted paired 
samples t-tests (again, as in Caspar et al., 2015). First, comparing Active versus No Hand conditions 
we predicted a longer average estimated interval to for the No Hand compared to the Active 
condition. Analysis supported this prediction (No Hand: 450.1, SD = 90.91; Active: 423.5, SD = 98.49; 
t(47) = 3.975, p < 0.001, one-tailed, Cohen’s d = 0.574; BH(0, 122.5) = 282.35, RR [2, 7446]). The 
alternative hypothesis, that the average interval estimation in the No Hand condition was longer 
than in the Active condition, was ~282 times more likely than the null hypothesis that average 
interval estimates were the same between these two conditions. This difference between Active and 
No Hand conditions is consistent with previously reported intentional binding results (Caspar et al., 
2015).  
 
Next, we compared the No Hand and Fake conditions. If intentional binding effects are driven by 
knowledge of intention, and simple causal binding cannot produce effects of equal magnitude, we 
would expect there to be no (or only a small) difference between the No Hand and Fake conditions. 
However, in disagreement with this expectation, we found that the average interval estimate in the 
Fake condition was numerically similar to that for Active (Fake: 427.7, SD = 94.66) and that estimates 
in the No Hand and Fake conditions were different (t(47) = 2.925, p = 0.016, paired samples, two-
tailed, Cohen’s d = 0.422; BN(0, 122.5)  = 4.25, RR [5.1, 175]). This result suggests that the alternative 
hypothesis, that average interval estimates differed between No Hand and Fake conditions, was 
more than 4 times more likely than the null hypothesis of no difference between conditions. As for 
the above comparison of Active and No Hand conditions, interval estimates in the Fake condition 
were shorter than in the No Hand condition. 
 
Finally, we compared Fake and Active conditions. If causal binding cannot produce an effect of the 
same magnitude as intentional binding, we would expect to find evidence that estimates in the Fake 
condition, in which visual and tactile feedback is the same as the Active condition but contains no 
intention or movement, are longer than in the Active condition. Contrary to this prediction, there 
was evidence for no difference in estimated interval between Active and Fake conditions (t(47) = 
0.569, p = 0.858, Cohen’s d = 0.082; BH(0, 122.5) = .10, RR [36.5, ∞]). This result indicates that the null 
hypothesis, that average interval estimates were the same in Fake and Active conditions, was 
around 10 times more likely than the alternative hypothesis that average interval estimates would 
differ between conditions. This suggests that causal binding can produce an effect of the same 
magnitude as intentional binding. 
 
Figure 3. A) Average (N = 48) reported interval for each level of presented interval (200, 400 and 800 
ms) in Active, No Hand, and Fake conditions in Experiment 1. Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. B) Average reported interval across three durations. Average reported interval was shorter 
in Active than No Hand trials, consistent with the presence of intentional binding in our VR setup. 
Average reported interval in Fake trials, in which participants made no intentional action but were 
given visual and tactile consistent with having done so, was also different from No Hand trials and 
the same as Active trials. 
Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 1 indicated that the presence of only visual and tactile feedback of a 
button being pressed by a virtual hand (Fake condition) was sufficient to produce an equivalent 
magnitude temporal binding effect as when the participant actually pressed the button (Active 
condition). This suggests that the temporal binding effects under interval estimation designs 
typically used as evidence for intentional binding are not necessarily indicating anything more than 
temporal binding between apparently causally related events (Buehner, 2012, 2015; Buehner & 
Humphreys, 2009). Alternatively, as our Fake condition consists of replays of the participants’ own 
previous button-press movements, participants may have had a feeling of ownership over the hand 
presentations in the Fake condition such that intentional binding-like effects occur even in the 
absence of any intentional action. If participants experienced equivalent subjective agency in the 
Fake and Active conditions, this could account for the lack of difference in interval estimation 
between these conditions observed in Experiment 1. To verify that participants judgments of Fake 
and Active conditions truly differed in subjective agency, Experiment 2 tested explicit ratings of both 
agency and causality for the Fake and Active conditions. 
Predictions 
It has been established that intentional actions are associated with increased subjective agency than 
unintentional actions, when measured by explicit ratings of agency (e.g., Haggard, Cartledge, Dafydd, 
& Oakley, 2004; Lush et al., 2017). We therefore have a predicted direction of effect for the 
difference between Fake and Active conditions in explicit agency rating such that Active trials, in 
which participants do press the button, should elicit larger ratings of agency than Fake trials. In this 
experiment, we used a rating scale with a minimum rating of 1 and maximum rating of 5. We 
therefore calculated Bayes factors for this directional prediction of differences between conditions 
(Active larger than Fake) using a uniform distribution with minimum of 0 and maximum of 4; 
predicting a minimum difference between conditions in average rating of 0 (same rating in each 
condition) and maximum difference of 4 (Fake always given minimum rating, Active given 
maximum). For the causality ratings, we didn’t have an expected direction of difference and so 
calculated Bayes factors using a uniform distribution with a minimum of -4 and maximum of 4 
(difference between conditions could fall anywhere between Fake being minimum and Active 
maximum rating, or vice versa). 
Results 
Figure 4A and 4C show the subjective ratings for agency and causality questions for each presented 
interval in each condition. Following the analysis structure as above for the interval estimation 
results, we conducted repeated measures ANOVAs for each task (Agency or Causality question) 
following up simple effects with paired samples frequentist and Bayesian t-tests. 
 
 A 2x3 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the Agency ratings in each condition (Active vs 
Fake) at the presented intervals (200, 400, 800msec). There were significant main effects for 
condition, F(1, 19) = 64.35, p<0.001, η² p  = 0.772, and interval, F(1.255, 23.846) = 30.97, p<0.001, η² 
= 0.62, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. There was also a significant interaction of condition and 
interval, F(1.365, 25.942) = 19.99, p<0.001, η² = 0.513. A separate repeated measures ANOVA 
conducted on Causality ratings in each condition (Active vs Fake) at the presented intervals (200, 
400, 800msec) revealed a significant main effect of interval, F(1.556, 29.560) = 43.466, p<0.001, η² = 
0.696, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. There was no evidence for an effect of condition, F(1, 19) = 
0.001, p=0.979, η² = 3.7 x 10-5.  
 
To investigate simple effects, we took the average of each participant’s rating for a given question 
and condition, across the three presented intervals. Figure 4B and 4D show the average rating for 20 
participants, for each question (Agency or Causality) and condition (Active or Fake). Comparing the 
average reported agency between Active and Fake conditions, we predicted that agency should be 
higher in the Active than Fake condition. A Bayesian paired-samples t-test revealed evidence that 
this was the case (Fake: 2.10, SD = 1.04; Active: 4.00, SD = 0.52; t(19) = 8.02, p < 0.001, one-tailed, 
Cohen’s d = 1.79; BU(0, 4) = 1.4x1013, RR [0, 4]). This result indicates that the alternative hypothesis, 
that there was a difference between agency reports in the Fake and Active conditions, was around 
14 trillion times more likely than the null hypothesis that there was no difference.  
 
In contrast to explicit judgements of agency, we had no directional predictions about the average 
reported causality between Active and Fake conditions. There was evidence for no difference in the 
average reported causality between Active and Fake conditions (Fake: 3.73, SD = 0.78; Active: 3.73, 
SD = 0.83; t(19) = 0.028, p = 0.978, paired samples, two-tailed, Cohen’s d = 0.006; , BU(-4, 4) = 0.06, RR 
[-4, 4]). For the Causality rating the null hypothesis (of no difference in Causality ratings between 
Fake and Active conditions) was ~17 times more likely than the alternative hypothesis. 
 Figure 4. Subjective rating (1-5) for Agency (A, B) and Causality (C, D) questions for Active and Fake 
conditions. The A and C show that ratings separated by condition and interval, while the B and D 
show the rating averaged across intervals. The subjective rating was higher in the Active than the 
Fake condition when the question was about agency (A; “How much did you feel your action caused 
the tone to occur?”), whereas the rating did not differ between Active and Fake conditions when the 
question was more generally about causality (B; “To what degree did the moving hand cause the 
tone to occur?”). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
Experiment 3 
The results of Experiment 1 provided clear evidence that intentional action is not required to obtain 
temporal binding effect of equivalent magnitude to that obtained in intentional binding studies. 
Experiment 2 showed that this result was could not be attributed to participants feeling agency over 
presentations of the virtual hand in the absence of intentional action. One possible criticism of these 
results might be that participants never truly felt that the virtual hand was their own. If participants 
never felt that the virtual hand belonged to them, it may have diminished the intentional binding 
effect in the Active condition, reducing the possible overall binding effect size and lead to similar 
binding effects in the Fake and Active conditions. The results of Experiment 2 indicate that this was 
unlikely to be the case as explicit ratings of agency were still strong, with ratings in the Active 
condition for short intervals near the maximum rating of the scale (5). Further, we note that the 
previously published results by Caspar and colleagues (Caspar et al., 2015), on which we based our 
expected effect size in analysing the results of Experiment 1, showed a large difference between 
active and passive conditions (average interval estimate difference of 122.5 msec between active 
and passive in their experiment). Although presented without any intermediate visual device, such 
as the head mounted display in our study, that study used an artificial hand presented in a displaced 
position from the participants’ hand. Such a setup certainly required some degree of belief by the 
participant regarding the potential for bodily ownership or control over an artificial hand and 
demonstrated large binding effects. Moreover, previous studies of the rubber-hand illusion and 
similar cases in VR have shown that typical metrics of bodily ‘ownership’ can be expressed for virtual 
body parts, particularly hands (IJsselsteijn, de Kort, Haans, & Kort, 2006; Slater, Perez-Marcos, 
Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2008, 2009). 
To provide evidence against the criticism that intentional binding using a virtual hand produces a 
reduced binding effect because of its virtual nature, we replicated Experiment 1 using an augmented 
rather than virtual reality setup. As outlined in the Methods, the setup for this experiment was 
identical to that described for Experiment 1 except for two features. Rather than participants 
viewing a virtual hand model that moved congruently with their hand movement, we showed 
participants their own arm, recorded through an eye-level mounted video camera against a green-
screen and played through the head-mounted display in real time. Using this method, we could 
avoid any effect of incongruity that participants might have felt when viewing a virtual arm model. 
Because we were only interested in whether the magnitude of binding effect had been diminished 
by the virtual reality setup, in the augmented reality setup we only included the No Hand and Active 
conditions. 
Predictions 
To test whether there was evidence for intentional binding in our augmented reality setup, we 
compared average interval estimations between No Hand and Active conditions. In Experiment 1, we 
found that the averaged interval estimation (the average of three levels: 200, 400 and 800 msec) 
was 26.6 msec shorter when participants actively pressed the button (Active condition) versus when 
they simply observed the button depress by itself (No Hand). We therefore calculated Bayes factors 
for this directional prediction (Active vs No Hand) of differences between conditions using a half-
normal with an SD of 26.6 msec. 
Under a hypothesis that the magnitude of binding in the Fake condition was similar to the Active 
condition in Experiment 1 only because participants never truly thought the virtual hand belonged to 
them, we would expect that the magnitude of binding effect would be smaller in Experiment 1 than 
in Experiment 3, where participants viewed real time input of their actual hand moving. Again 
informed by results of (Caspar et al., 2015) we calculated Bayes factors for this directional prediction 
of differences between experiments (virtual reality binding smaller than augmented reality binding) 
using a uniform distribution with a minimum of 13.5 and maximum of  122.5 msec based on the fact 
that these were the smallest (active congruent versus control condition) and largest (active 
congruent versus passive congruent) differences between conditions reported in that study (Caspar 
et al. 2015; section Interval Estimation, page 228) and therefore represent the reasonable range of 
differences in magnitude of binding effect that might be expected between our virtual (Experiment 
1) and augmented (Experiment 3) results. 
Results 
Analyses are similar to those reported for Experiment 1. Figure 5A shows average reported intervals 
for each presented interval in Active and No Hand conditions for the AR hand. A 2x3 repeated 
measures ANOVA with within-subject factors of condition (Active and No Hand) and presented 
intervals (200, 400, 800msec) was conducted. There were significant main effects for condition, 
F(1,29) = 6.893, p=0.014, η²  = 0.192, and interval, F(1.085,31.464) = 215.918, p<0.001, η²  = 0.882, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected.  
 
Examining the simple effects, we again took the average of interval estimates across the three 
presented intervals, for each participant and condition, and conducted paired samples t-tests. 
Comparing Active versus No Hand conditions, as outlined in the Predictions section above, based on 
previous intentional binding results we expected the average estimated interval to be longer in the 
No Hand than Active condition. There was evidence that this was the case (No Hand: 436.2, SD = 
100.3; Active: 406, SD = 99.4; t(29) = 2.604, p = 0.007, paired samples, one-tailed, Cohen’s d = 0.475; 
BH(0, 26.6) = 13.667, RR [5.7, 225.9]). This difference between Active and No Hand conditions is again 
consistent with the presence of an intentional binding effect, this time in our augmented reality 
setup (rather than the previous VR setup).  
 
To directly compare the magnitude of binding effect in the results from Experiment 1 using virtual 
reality with those from Experiment 3 where we used an augmented reality presentation, we 
compared the magnitude of binding effect (No Hand minus Active average interval estimate) 
between the two experiments. Based on the hypothesis that participants may have felt less agency 
over the hand model in virtual reality (Experiment 1) than in augmented reality (Experiment 3), we 
expected the binding effect to be smaller in the Experiment 1 results than those for Experiment 3. 
Contrary to this hypothesis, a Bayesian paired samples t-test revealed evidence for no difference 
between binding effects (VR binding: 26.6, SD = 46.38; AR binding: 30.2, SD = 63.5; t(76) = 0.287, p = 
0.387, independent samples, one-tailed, Cohen’s d = 0.067; BU(13.5, 122.5) = 0.064, RR [0, ∞]). 
 
Figure 5. A) Average (N = 30) reported interval for each level of presented interval (200, 400 and 800 
msec) in Active and No Hand conditions in Experiment 2. Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. B) Average reported interval across three presented durations. Mean reported interval was 
shorter in Active than No Hand trials, consistent with intentional binding being observed in our AR 
setup. 
 
Discussion 
We investigated temporal binding between a button press and an outcome tone when the button 
was pressed by the participant controlling or simply observing a virtual hand press the button, or 
when the button moved by itself. When the button moved by itself, binding was smaller than that 
produced by voluntary action. Such a result might typically be interpreted as evidence for intentional 
binding. However, comparing two conditions in which the virtual hand pressed the button – one in 
which the hand precisely tracked participants’ intentional movements, the other simply replaying 
the sensory content of previous button-presses without any participant action - there was no 
difference in binding. Explicit reports of agency did not match this pattern: participants reported 
higher agency over the controlled than merely observed virtual hand. These results provide the first 
statistically supported evidence for no difference in the magnitude of intentional and causal binding 
when conditions control for all information except internal signals (e.g., intention or proprioception). 
These results underline the importance of considering the influence of causal relationships when 
interpreting binding results (Buehner, 2012, 2015). Intentional binding is often interpreted as a 
measure of sense of agency (Moore & Obhi, 2012). Such claims often rely only on previous studies 
which report an influence of intention to draw a link between binding and sense of agency, but this 
may result in inaccurate inferences. For example, if we assume binding reflects sense of agency, we 
might interpret the current results as demonstrating that participants have a sense of agency over 
an observed action (because we find the same magnitude of ‘intentional binding’ in the Fake 
condition), but that the type of sense of agency reflected in binding dissociates from explicit sense of 
agency. However, we should first consider the more parsimonious explanation that binding effects 
don’t necessarily reflect sense of agency. In-principle protection for the position that binding reflects 
agency has previously been provided by the fact that binding effects for non-intentional conditions 
have never produced a similar magnitude effect to those from intentional action conditions (e.g., 
Buehner, 2015). Our present results demonstrate that such a position is no longer defensible.  
It has been argued that intentional binding may be driven by cross-modal cue combination (Kawabe 
et al., 2013; Wolpe, Haggard, Siebner, & Rowe, 2013, Lush, Roseboom, Cleeremans, Seth, Scott & 
Dienes, 2018), with the estimate of action or outcome event timing a precision-weighted estimate of 
both. One source of precision for action timing may arise from information related to motor-
intentions and this may account for the contribution of intentional action to the magnitude of 
binding (Lush et al., 2017, 2016; Lush & Dienes, 2018). Poonian & Cunnington, (2013) report reduced 
binding when a button moved by itself compared to when the button was pressed by an observed 
arm (orthogonal to the participant). While the authors argued against a cue combination 
mechanism, a parsimonious explanation for this result is that arm movement preceding the button 
press provides a visual cue which increases the precision of action timing. This is likely to apply to 
the results presented here; specifically, in our VR setup with the arm movement in the first person 
perspective, visual information may be more reliable than other sources of information (e.g., motor 
intentions or proprioception) and the contribution of intention-related information over and above 
causal binding in such a case may be minimal enough to be undetectable by interval estimation. 
Thus, a cue combination mechanism can account for these results without appealing to changes in 
the sense of agency. Note that this does not imply that temporal binding never reflects sense of 
agency, merely that intention is not necessary for causal binding of the same magnitude as 
intentional binding. 
Intentional binding in a VR environment can generate binding effects of equal magnitude to causal 
binding arising from merely observed action. Intentional binding research must account for the 
magnitude of causal temporal binding before relating temporal binding to the sense of agency. 
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